A new type of group key distribution (GKD), called 'full-healing' group key distribution (F-GKD), is proposed in this paper which helps new-added members to recover the historical session keys. On the basis of the F-GKD scheme, a security approach is proposed for the privacy preservation of online social networks (OSNs). Compared with conventional public-key approaches, our approach has the following advantages: (1) only the polynomial interpolation computation is executed in our approach, which is much lighter than modulo exponentiation or pairing operations, (2) 1-to-many key distribution is more efficient and scalable than 1-to-1 style in public-key approaches, (3) full-healing property speeds up the historical session recovery (HSR), which has the de facto practicability in OSN services. Experiment is also implemented to evaluate the performance of our approach.
Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter and Google+ have become extremely popular around the world in recent years. These OSN applications attract billions of users to share personal information, photographs or videos with their friends (Jin et al., 2013) . Users trust the OSN service; they interact with each other via the OSN service, and also upload and store their personal data on the OSN server. However, this causes the privacy disclosure. On one hand, for example, the OSN service provider is likely to leak users' data (e.g., photo, address, articles, sexual preference, etc.) to a third party without user's authorisation for some governmental or commercial purposes. On the other hand, the OSN server sites are also suffering various malicious attacks, including spam and Sybil attacks, re-identification attacks, etc. (Gao et al., 2011) .
Considering the private preservation in OSN service, researchers proposed a kind of user-controlled encryption schemes to put the policy decisions in the hands of users. The main idea is that
• users encrypt the data at their own locality and upload the cipher text to the OSN service sites
• users implement the key distribution/sharing with their OSN friends via out-of-band communications.
The data to be sent or uploaded can be classified, and each category of them is encrypted by the corresponding keys. The benefit lets OSN users themselves decide who can access what kind of information at what time. The OSN service provider, however, cannot obtain any raw data of users.
Public-key encryption
Public-key encryption (PKE) is a natural tool for key distribution/sharing between the data owner and his or her friends (Seo et al., 2014) . For example, Lucas and Borisov (2008) proposed a flyByNight architecture to mitigate the privacy risks of Facebook. Each user generates a public/ private key pair at the first time to interact the flyByNight. When a user needs to send a message or share a data to friends via Facebook, he or she first enters the message text into the flyByNight application. The application can obtain the complete list of the user's friends who have also installed the flyByNight and access their public keys. The user selects to whom the message is delivered; the client-side JavaScript encrypts the message with necessary public keys and then sends the ciphertext via Facebook.
The existence of these messages is public to Facebook, but their contents are encrypted. In the FlyByNight, the public-key cryptography is directly used for message encryption, but this is computationally expensive to be implemented on large files. Another approach is to use public-key cryptography for group-key distribution (GKD) (Naor et al., 2001; Wong et al., 2000) . For example, Alice creates a group from a list of known friends and obtains the public key of each group member. She encrypts a generated group key with the public key of each member of the group. Then Alice sends the group key to the group member and uses the group key to encrypt messages to the group.
Besides the traditional public-key cryptography, attribute-based encryption (ABE) public key also attracts many concerns (Baden et al., 2009; Jahid et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2013) . ABE public key (APK) defines an access structure and can be used to grant access permission to an unknown set of users. But ABE operations are about 100-1000 times slower than those of RSA (Baden et al., 2009) .
The shortcoming of PKE (APK)-based schemes is the low-efficient performance in processing GKD. For example, in a chatting group with n participants, the group initiator (GI) generates a group key (GK) to encrypt the chatting contents. The GI must obtain all the public keys of the other (n -1) group members (GMs) and implement (n -1) PKE operations. Rekeying is required if a member leaves the group: the GI generates a new GK and implements (n -2) PKE operations for the remaining GMs. The dynamic change of group membership causes considerable computational and communicational overheads during the rekeying process.
Historical session recovery
In OSN applications, however, the 'backward secrecy' is not required. For example,
• Online chatting is a basic function of OSNs. In a chatting group established among classmates, all group members may not be added at the same time: some of them are added very early (maybe at the beginning of the group set-up), and some of them are added very late (after months and years later). For the new-comers, they want to know what has been discussed before their joining. We assume that the authorised members of this chat group have the same privilege to access the chat content. So in this scenario, the new-comers require to access the historical session keys and use them to decrypt the previous chat records. In this paper, we name this requirement as 'historical session recovery (HSR)'.
• Data sharing is another core valuable function of OSNs. The data owner instantly updates the statues and shares the information with friends via uploading the multimedia or text files to an OSN service site (e.g., cloud, network disk, etc.). To protect the personal privacy, the data owner may implement the data encryption and key management in person. From the perspective of being granted or not, all the authorised users form a 'friend-group', in which the data owner acts as the group initiator (GI) and the file encryption keys can be seen as the group session keys. Rekeying is necessary if a user is revoked from the 'friend-group' to guarantee the forward security. When a new authorised user joins the 'friend-group', the HSR should be also satisfied here because the new friend has the same privilege to read the historical statues as other group members.
A naive solution of HSR is to request additional transmission from the Key Generation Center (KGC), but both requesting and re-transmission increase the communication overhead and group management. A class of 'self-healing' GKD schemes have been introduced by Staddon et al., (2002 ) since 2002 (Rams and Pacyna, 2002 Tian et al., 2011a) . The property of 'self-healing' enables the dynamic group members, who missed one or more updated messages, to self-recover the missing session keys from the recent key distribution broadcast message. The drawback of 'self-healing' is that it is not able to recover the last session key. That is to say, a member who misses the current key distribution message has to wait until the next session to recover the previous missing key. In 2005, the idea of 'mutual-healing' GKD was proposed by Bohio and Miri (2005) and it was further studied by Tian et al. (2011b) in 2011. In Tian et al.'s scheme, authorised group members are cooperative with each other, so that a trusted neighbour can help to recover the missing session key of the last session. However, in both 'self-healing' and 'mutual-healing' schemes, a group member is only able to recover keys during the registered sessions (by self-relying or neighbour-relying). That is to say, the new-comer, who joins the chat group later than other classmates, cannot obtain the total historical records by self-healing or mutualhealing.
In this paper, we introduce a new type of GKD, called full-healing group-key distribution (F-GKD). We employ a one-way function into the key generation phase, so that any new-added member can recover all the historical session keys by 'full-healing', without any additional transmissions by group manager (GM) or other neighbouring members. The F-GKD is designed to support applications with the requirement of 'HSR'. Furthermore, it is information theoretically secure, communication efficient and flexible owing to Shamir's secret sharing (Shamir, 1979) . Forward secrecy is ensured owing to the one-way hash operations.
Contribution
The contributions of this paper are summarised as follows.
First, we proposed a basic F-GKD scheme. We discussed the requirement of HSR, gave a formal definition of security model and provided the security proof and performance analysis. The full-healing property made the new-added to derive the historical session keys without any additional transmissions. Therefore, compared with other traditional GKD schemes (Harn and Lin, 2010; Liu et al., 2013) , the F-GKD scheme not only saved a quantity of communication overheads, but also omitted the extra authentication between later-added members and earlieradded members.
Second, based on the F-GKD scheme, we proposed a novel security approach for privacy preservation to OSNs, especially to group chat tools and data sharing services. Unlike conventional approaches based on public-key cryptography, only the polynomial interpolation computation was executed in our approach, which was much lighter than modulo exponentiation or pairing operations. Experiment was implemented to evaluate the performance of our approach.
Third, the HSR has the de facto practicability in OSN services. It helps a new added user to quickly access the previous online information without additional communication or authentication. The introduced solution, which employed a one-way hash function to pre-construct a key-box during the initialisations, might be referred as a precedent and inspiration to the next step researches.
Organisation. The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduced a basic F-GKD scheme, including the security model, formal definition and analysis is given. In Section 3, we proposed a novel security approach for privacy preservation to OSNs, especially to group chat tools and data sharing services. And Section 4 concluded the paper and addressed the future works.
Full-healing group-key distribution
In the proposed scheme, the group manager (GM) is responsible to register all group members, and performs the addition, revocation and other maintaining operations. GM also takes the role of a trusted KGC, which generates the session keys and distributes key by broadcasting messages. Only registered users are called 'authorised group members' and each of them is distributed with a personal secret S by GM in registration. During initialisation, GM constructs a secret KEY-BOX based on one-way hash, e.g., MD5 (Rivest, 1992) or SHA-1 (FIPS:180-4: Secure Hash Standard, 2012). General discussion on one-way hash functions can be found in the work by Schneier (1996) . The life of a communication group is divided into sessions. At the beginning of each session, GM constructs a sessionpolynomial F by combing the information of session keys, which are chosen from the KEY-BOX, with all group members' personal secrets. On the basis of Shamir's secret sharing, GM uses F to generate the broadcasting messages to distribute session keys among group members over an open channel.
Network and threaten model
The F-GKD relies on a KGC-based group communication model. The network consists of a single Group Manager (GM) and a finite number of Users U. Except the group initialising and maintaining operations, GM also takes the charge of key generation, distribution, renewal and revocation as a KGC. The main goal of GKD is to establish common session keys among GM and Group Members G to secure the group communication (where G ⊆ U). Group is dynamic, and members can apply for joining and leaving at any time. Therefore, the session key must be updated with sessions upon membership change.
The life of a group communication is divided into distinct sessions with the maximum number of m. At the beginning of each session, GM computes the session key and distributes it by broadcasting. The broadcast message is constructed in such a special way that only users belonging to an authorised subset of U can recover the session key. The key-renewal is triggered periodically by key-expiration. The session-renewal is triggered by session-expiration or membership change. Users' joining, leaving and re-joining must be previously applied at GM, so that maintaining the session can be easily implemented.
We consider two kinds of attackers: outside attacker and inside attacker. The outside attacker is an adversary who never registers in the communication group thus without owning any valid personal secret. The goal of the outside attacker is to try to impersonate to be an authorised group member and track all the conversations in the group. The outside attacks can be prevented by both hardware and software manners. On one hand, some hardware techniques like tamper resistance can be deployed, so that the attacker cannot get the personal secret from a compromised device of the authorised member. On the other hand, any user has to register at the GM and use the shared personal secret to compute session keys, which ensures that a user cannot virtually join the conversations unless being authorised by the GM. The inside attacker is an authorised group member with a valid personal secret. One goal of inside attackers is likely to collude with each other to recover an innocent group member's personal secret. Another goal might be hiding in the group to leak secrets as a spy or a traitor. In this situation, additional security measures must be deployed to block the intrusion, for example, strict authentication during registration (Nguyen and Roscoe, 2011) , audit monitoring and intrusion detection system (Wu and Banzhaf, 2008) , etc.
We will propose an F-GKD scheme using a one-way hash function and Shamir's secret sharing with following properties:
• Full-healing. The scheme enables new-added members to self-recover the historical session keys without additional transmissions from GM or other members.
• Security. The scheme is collusion-resistant without threshold, which means that no matter how many compromised members working together can recover no information of un-compromised members' personal secrets. It defends against impersonating attack launched by outside attackers since only authorised users can pass the registration. Besides, forward secrecy is guaranteed, such that revoked members cannot get any keys during their revocation sessions.
• Efficiency. The scheme is energy efficient so that it can be deployed on mobile devices with limited battery power and resources. Besides, it should minimise the time delay incurred from the key management processes.
• Flexibility. The scheme should support for various sizes of communication groups. It also supports more than one group member to add/leave at the same time.
Notations are listed in Table 1 .
Definition
We give a formal definition of F-GKD as follows.
is a group manager to perform initialisation, addition, revocation and other maintaining operations of the group. The life of the group communication is divided into distinct sessions with the maximum number of m. Let
be an access structure of subsets of G 0 that can be revoked from the group. Let
and j G U ⊆ denote the group established by GM in session j, S i denote personal secret of user U i , SK j denote the session key generated and distributed by GM in session j, B j denote the broadcast message sent by GM in the session j, Z i, j denote the information leaned by U i through B j and S i , R j denote the revoked member from session j.
A scheme D is a full-healing GKD scheme if the following is true:
1 D is a session key distribution with privacy if (introduced by Staddon et al. (2002) 
R i
The set of all revoked users in session j
Cryptographically secure one-way functions 
Basic scheme
Key distribution based on secret sharing has attracted much attention owing to the good performances in security and efficiency (Harn and Lin, 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2013) . In this section, by combining Shamir's secret sharing with one-way hash, we propose a basic F-GKD scheme which helps new-added members to self-recover the historical session keys. This scheme relies on a trusted GM to operate both group management and key management (i.e., GM is KGC of the group).
(1) Initialisation
The KGC (GM) randomly chooses two safe primes p, q (i.e., primes such that
are also primes) and computes n = pq (p, q are kept secret; n is made public). The number of total users is { } 1 , , . :
* as following steps:
:
3 KGC constructs a secret KEY-BOX by :
NG G ∩ =∅ ) be the set of users who apply to join or re-join the group from session j. Each user belonging to NG j must register at KGC(GM) as following steps:
1 KGC authenticates the set of users NG j and decides whether they have permission to join the group. 
and ( , , ) 
( )
owing to the points of ( )
with Mac j . In this scheme, the potential session key in session j is a key-set:
Remark 1: The KEY-BOX is denoted as a two-dimensional matrix, in which elements in column form a reversed oneway hash chain:
and elements in row form the potential key-set among G j in session j:
For each hash-chain, KGC(GM) chooses
in sequence as the session keys from session 1 to session m to provide the 'full-healing' property. For each potential key-set, KGC(GM) chooses → …→ in sequence as GROUP-KEY among G j . In practical operations, those k keys in SK j will not all be used unless membership does not change before session j expiration. KGC keeps tracking all registered users and removing any un-subscriber from the group. A synchronisation mechanism is constantly deployed to guarantee consistence between cipher text and its encryption keys.
(4) Historical session key recovery (full-healing)
be the group set-up by GM in session j, and let GM takes full responsibility of users' authentication and registration; they make decisions of adding, re-adding, revoking and expelling of group members. Moreover, a user, once been expelled by GM in history, cannot re-join the group.
Remark 3: For any 
is personal secret of NM i and
is a random challenge broadcasted by NM i . KGC(GM) randomly selects d′ -1 additional points B − can recover the current key-set SK j for session j, as well as all historical session keys by full-healing.
(6) Member revocations
If some member is revoked from session j, no matter it is applying to leave or been expelled by GM, the session is triggered to be renewed into session j+1. At the beginning of session j + 1, GM constructs F j+1 (x) and the broadcast message B j+1 (following the same processes in Section 3.1) to distribute the key-set SK j+1 to G j+1 . According to the construction process of session polynomial, F j+1 (x) cannot be recovered by any user 1 ,
Of course for a user,
by full-healing in future session s; however, no information about SK j+1 can be obtained by U i at the session j + 1.
Security
We prove that the proposed F-GKD scheme satisfies all requirements of the defined security model in Section 2. 
(b) For an authorised member ,
is randomly generated and secretly distributed by GM when U i registers for join or re-join the group. That is, the personal secrets of different members are distinctive; the personal secrets of the same user joining at different sessions are distinctive. For any coalition, users cannot derive the personal secrets of any other authorised group member.
(c) For any session j, the session-polynomial F j (x) is determined by combining two parts: the key-set SK j obtained from KEY-BOX and authorised members' personal secrets. Without the broadcast message B j , the set of t personal secrets { } 1 , , t S S … is only t discrete points on two-dimensional plane. So the personal secrets alone do not give any information about any session key. Without the personal secret, only B j cannot reveal enough amount of information to reconstruct the session polynomial.
So the broadcast messages { } 1 , , m B B … alone do not give information about any session key.
Theorem 2: The proposed F-GKD scheme has the fullhealing property.
Proof: During session j:
, ,
for any authorised member M i , no matter he or she is a new joined, re-joined or earlier joined member, can derive the historical session key-sets by hash-computing, as long as he or she can correctlly compute the key-set
SK sk sk = … Therefore, the proposed F-GKD scheme has the full-healing property to enable new-added members to self-recover the historical session keys without additional transmissions from GM or other members. together they cannot get information about the key-set SK j . As proved in Theorem 1(a) and (b), the personal secrets of different users are discrete and random. Any un-authorised user, ,
because his personal secret is not used in session polynomial construction. Therefore, the F-GKD scheme is information theoretically secure, where coalition of any users in R cannot compute the key-set SK j .
Theorem 4:
The proposed F-GKD scheme guarantees Rwise forward secrecy.
Proof: Suppose j R U ⊆ and j R ∈ R, and user i j U R ∈ are revoked before the current session j. The coalition R j can reveal nothing about the current key-set
even knowing the key-sets before session j:
This is because the key-set of each session is chosen from the pre-defined KEY-BOX that is constructed by one-way hash chains. The one-way property of each key-chain gurantees that it is computationally infeasible to compute
Theorem 5: The proposed F-GKD scheme is outside attack resistant.
Proof: Suppose an outside attacker, who is not registered at the KGD, might impersonate to be an authorised user to participate the group communication. Since Shamir's secret sharing is information theoretically secure, any fewer than d points cannot reveal any information about the d-degree session polynomial. Therefore, the outside attack is resistant by the proposed F-GKD scheme.
Theorem 6: The proposed F-GKD scheme is inside attack resistant.
Proof: Suppose , ,
where U adv is an inside attacker in session j, U tar is a targeted member. The goal of inside attackers is to collude with each other to recover an innocent group member's personal secret. Since U adv is authorised, he can compute the session polynomial by combining public points with information of
. 
Efficiency
Storage. We propose a new GKD scheme with 'full-healing' property. Besides the 'HSR', the F-GKD scheme has another advantage in saving the storage overhead of session keys. Different from other GKD schemes (Rafaeli and Hutchison, 2003; Klaoudatou et al., 2011; Cho et al., 2011) , a group member does not store an entire key map for historical conversations, but only stores a single key-set for the current session. All the previous key-sets can be easily derived for the 'full-healing' property. This is especially efficient in a long-term communication group.
Computation overhead. The F-GKD scheme employs Shamir's secret sharing to realise the GKD (Harn and Lin, 2012; Liu et al., 2013) , in which the computation overhead, occurred in Lagrange interpolation and hash-computing, is lightweight especially suitable for mobile phone, tablet PC or computer.
Communication overhead. Communication overhead mainly occurs in key distribution phases, in which KGC(GM) distributes a set of k keys for a session only by one broadcast message. In the new-member addition, only new-added members participate in communication and computation for the session key. The most important is the new-added or re-added members are not necessary to request the historical session keys from KGC (GM) or other members by additional transmission. Compared with pure GKD schemes (Harn and Lin, 2012; Liu et al., 2013) , this feature not only saves a quantity of communication overheads, but also omits the extra authentication between later-added members and earlieradded members.
Applications in OSNs

An application for chat tools
One application is in a chat and instant messaging system such as Skype, WeChat, MSN, etc., a user can set up a family chatting group consisting of several family members. In such a group, both previous group members and later added ones have the reason and desire to read all chatting content even in historical sessions. If all sessions are transmitted and stored in plaintext manner, there is no problem that a new member can read the chatting content before his or her addition. However, if sessions are processed in cipher text manner, it is a critical problem for a new member of how to achieve the encryption keys and how to match them to each session. Naive solutions, such as single-key-encrypted-all-sessions or additional-transmitkeys-mapping, are not efficient or secure for a widespread instant application such as Skype, WeChat, and MSN, etc. In this scenario, our proposed F-GKD scheme satisfies the requirement of 'HSR' for a new added member. For example, the F-GKD scheme can be added to WeChat App as a plug-in, in which, the group caller works as the GM and takes charge of key generation, distribution, renewal and revocation, and each group callee works as a member and has the ability of key re-construction and key recovery. As shown in Figure 1 , this plug-in makes the 'Chat Recover' function available for a group callee to recover the encrypted historical chatting content which even happened before his or her addition. 
An application for data share tools
The data sharing is the core valuable of OSN service. The data owner instantly updates the statues and shares the information with friends via uploading the multimedia or text files to an OSN service site (e.g., cloud, network disk, etc.). However, users' personal information is disclosed to the public, which includes personal identity, location, contact, photos, videos and social relationship. In some cases, raw private information was being leaked directly; in some other cases, however, the information leakage in manner of the data collection and combination derived more significant value and privacy problems. Furthermore, merging online and offline data generates a much rich picture of users which can be sold to interested parties.
To provide privacy preservation, the commonly adopted approach is to encrypt the data before uploading and distributing the encryption key to authorised users by using public-key cryptography. E.g., Persona (Baden et al., 2009) . Figure 2 shows a high-level architecture of the typical approach to support user self-encryption on OSN. There are three entities in the system: the content-provider (CP) client, the content-requestor (CR) client and the OSN server. The OSN server provides two services: the cipher text storage and security mediation. At one side, a data owner uploads the encrypted data to the OSN server via a CP client, and on another side, a friend user who is authorised can access the encrypted data and decrypt them by the CR client. The KGC, which generates the encryption keys and distributes them to each CR, is usually resided in the CP client or server. In this section, we employ our F-GKD scheme to propose a secure and efficient security approach for the data sharing service of OSNs. Unlike some public-key approach (Seo et al., 2014) , our approach does not allow the OSN server to interpose the key generation and distribution process. We deploy the KGC function into the CP client, and the service does not participate into the key escrowing and data decryption. Thus, the on-server data will not be disclosed to the untrusted server administration or hackers who hack and control the server. Our approach insists on five phases. The detailed process is as follows (as shown in Figure 3 ):
The KGC in CP client executes the initialisation operation of the F-GKD scheme (presented in Section 2) and generates the Key-Box. This is a one-time task and all the following steps of key distribution/rekeying are based on this Key-Box. It should be noted that the key-chains which are used to construct the Key-Box might be as long enough to support frequently rekeying operations.
(2) CP data encryption and uploading
The CP client obtains the encryption key and the key_id from the KGC, and then encrypts each datum by using symmetric cryptography, e.g., AES. CP uploads the cipher text along with the relative text_id and key_id to the OSN server.
During the period between two rekeying operations, all data are encrypted with the same key. So these cipher texts are stored along with the same key_id on the server.
Besides, the key_id should be enumerated by algebraic order to support the historical key recovery operations in CR client. For example, the key_id of the first generated key is defined as 1, that of the second key is defined as 2, and so on.
(3) CR registration
The CP client generates a unique private token, (e.g., the 'personal secret' ( , ) 
by the basic scheme in Section 2) for each authorised user U i . Users must carefully save their private tokens, because any imposter who has installed a CR client could decrypt the on-server cipher text by stealing a legal private token.
(4) CP public-token uploading
By running the 'Session Key Distribution' phase in Section 2, the CP client constructs a public token for an encryption key by combining all the private tokens of registered users. Then CP client uploads the public token (e.g., the public points on the session polynomial F(x) by the basic scheme) along with the key_id.
As mentioned above, all the authorised users and the data owner form a 'friend-group' communication. The data owner acts as the virtual group initiator and distributes the group key to members by exposing a public token on a public server. Any membership changes cause a public token renewal.
If a new registered user is added into the 'group', the CP client must construct a new public token by adding the private token information of the new friend (e.g., GM constructs a new session polynomial by the basic scheme in Section 2). CP client uploads the updated public token to the server and covers the previous one. The earlier users, who have reconstructed the encryption key, are not affected by the new user addition. Note that the CR client reconstructs the same encryption key by using these two public token, because no rekeying is executed at this situation.
If a user is revoked from the 'group', the data owner first implements the rekeying by obtaining a new encryption key from the Key-Box and then computes the relative public token of the new key. CR client uploads this public token along with the key_id of the renewal key. And all data uploaded after the user revocation must be encrypted with the updated encryption key. When a user wants to read some information on the server, he or she sends a request to the server via the CR client.
The server sends the current public token along with the relative key_id to the CR client. If the user is registered, the CR client can reconstruct an encryption key by combining the public key with its private token (e.g., the processes of computing the polynomial F j (x) and recovering the primary keys by the basic scheme in Section 2). The on-server cipher texts are encrypted with different keys according to their uploading sequence. The key, directly reconstructed above, is the newest one and has the largest key_id. The full-healing property of our F-GKD scheme enables flexible and easy key recovery. Thus, the CR client can obtain the encryption key of any interested data on the server. (The difference between two key_id decides the hash distance. And the detailed full-healing process has been presented in Section 2.)
Performance and comparison
In this section, we use an example scenario to compare our F-GKD approach with public-key approaches, e.g., flyByNight and Persona. The data owner Alice creates a group of t friends and Alice shares information with friends via an OSN service. Bob is a friend within the friend group. Table 2 compares the processes of establishing a group key by using different approaches.
We compare these approaches by evaluating the computation overheads of Alice, which mainly incur in two processes: message encryption and key distribution.
First, the flyByNight approach has the largest computation overhead because the public key cryptography is used for message encryption/decryption, but the symmetric cryptography is used in F-GKD and Persona.
Table 2
Comparison of the processes in establishing a group key by using different approaches Then, we further compare the F-GKD and Persona approaches by evaluating the computation overheads in key distribution phase. The core computation is a matrix multiplication in F-GKD approach and it is a PKE/decryption in Persona. An experiment is implemented, in which, we assume the primary_key = 1 in the F-GKD scheme, and an RSA-1024bit is implemented in Person approach; the length of the encryption is 128bit in both approaches. The experiment is carried out in Python with version 2.7. We used a test machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 CPU of 3.2GHz and with 4-GB of RAM, running on Windows 7 Enterprise (32bit) operation system. The experiment results are shown in Figure 4 (a) and (b). The x-axis represents the variable of the growing group size; the y-axis represents the execution time needed to compute a key in different approaches. The curve of 'matrix multiplication' represents the computing result of the F-GKD approach, while the curve of 'RSA' represents the computing result of the Persona approach. As shown in Figure 4 (a), our F-GKD approach has distinct computing superiority compared with the Persona approach when the group scale is small. For example, when the group size is 10, the Persona approach takes 2.8 ms, but the F-GKD approach only takes 0.04 ms. In both F-GKD and Persona approaches, the execution time of computing a key is increased with the group size. And the F-GKD approach keeps the advantage until the group size exceeds 1000, as shown in Figure 4 (b). That is, in a group with no more than 1000 members, the F-GKD approach reduces the computation overheads and speeds up the key distribution procedure of the Persona approach. Note that 1000 should be large enough for a communication group in most OSN applications.
Conclusion and future work
A F-GKD scheme is proposed to support some practical (but not confidential and critical) applications with requirement of 'HSR'. The property of 'full-healing' can help a later-added authorised member to self-recover the historical secret conversations among earlier added members, without additional transmissions from group manager or other neighbouring members. In the paper, we first give a formal definition of the F-GKD model, and then propose a basic F-GKD scheme using one-way hash and secret sharing. Analysis is also given to prove the confidentiality and efficiency (in saving storage and communication overheads) of the scheme. OSNs are continuingly growing in terms of user quantity and time, network traffic and corresponding business commerce. On the basis of the F-GKD scheme, we also proposed a novel security approach for privacy preservation to OSNs, especially to group chat tools and data sharing services. Unlike conventional approaches based on public-key cryptography, only the polynomial interpolation computation is executed in our approach, which is much lighter than exponent or pairing operations. Besides, appending the 'full-healing' property to a pure GKD scheme reduces the communication overhead incurred during the historical session transmissions. Experiment was implemented to evaluate the performance of our approach.
